Loss-tolerant measurement-device-independent quantum random number
  generation by Cao, Zhu et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
51
0.
08
96
0v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
30
 O
ct 
20
15
Loss-tolerant measurement-device-independent
quantum random number generation
Zhu Cao, Hongyi Zhou, Xiongfeng Ma
Center for Quantum Information, Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences,
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
Abstract. Quantum random number generators (QRNGs) output genuine random
numbers based upon the uncertainty principle. A QRNG contains two parts in
general — a randomness source and a readout detector. How to remove detector
imperfections has been one of the most important questions in practical randomness
generation. We propose a simple solution, measurement-device-independent QRNG,
which not only removes all detector side channels but is robust against losses. In
contrast to previous fully device-independent QRNGs, our scheme does not require
high detector efficiency or nonlocality tests. Simulations show that our protocol can
be implemented efficiently with a practical coherent state laser and other standard
optical components. The security analysis of our QRNG consists mainly of two
parts: measurement tomography and randomness quantification, where several new
techniques are developed to characterize the randomness associated with a positive-
operator valued measure.
PACS numbers:
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1. Introduction
Random numbers have applications in many fields including industry, scientific
computing, and cryptography [1, 2]. In particular, the randomness of the key is the
security foundation for all the cryptographic tasks. Any bias on random numbers may
result in security loopholes [3].
Traditionally, there are two types of random number generators (RNGs), pseudo-
RNGs and physical RNGs. A pseudo-RNG is a deterministic expansion of random
seeds and hence not random [4]. A physical RNG is based on chaotic physical process
such as noise in electric devices [5], oscillator jitter [6], and circuit decay [7]. Since
a full characterization of a physical RNG process may enable an adversary to predict
the outcomes, the randomness is not information-theoretically provable. In practice,
it is very challenging to rule out the bias in output random numbers, and hence these
physical RNGs may lead to security loopholes when employed in cryptographic tasks.
On the other hand, quantum random number generators (QRNGs), stemming
from the intrinsic uncertainty of quantum measurement outcomes, are able to output
randomness that is guaranteed by quantum mechanics. Some popular QRNG schemes
include single photon detection [8, 9, 10], vacuum state fluctuation [11] and quantum
phase fluctuation [12, 13]. The output randomness of these QRNG relies on assumptions
on the realization devices. In practice, however, device imperfections may lead to
potential loopholes, which can be exploited by an adversary.
To solve this problem, device-independent QRNG (DIQRNG) schemes, whose
output randomness does not rely on specific physical implementations, have been
proposed [14]. Based on quantum non-locality, such a DIQRNG is mainly designed with
entangled particles and can certify genuine randomness. By performing measurements
on two entangled systems and checking whether the correlation violates a certain Bell
inequality, true random numbers are generated. It has been proved that high detection
efficiency (over 2/3) and space separation are necessary in such a device-independent
scheme [15, 16]. However, normal optical detectors, with which all practical fast QRNGs
are built, only have an overall efficiency around 10% and do not satisfy this condition.
In fact, loophole-free DIQRNGs have not yet been demonstrated in labs up till now [17].
Similar issues also exist in another quantum cryptographic task — quantum key
distribution (QKD). In order to solve the practical issues in the device-independent
schemes, additional assumptions are added to make the schemes more practical [18, 19].
In particular, a measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD scheme is proposed [20]
such that all the detection loopholes can be removed using trusted source devices. The
MDIQKD scheme turns out to be loss-tolerant and very effective to defend against
practical attacks [21, 22], without using complicated characterization on devices [23].
The security of MDIQKD stems from the time-reversed EPR-based QKD protocols
[24, 25, 26].
Unfortunately, the idea of MDIQKD cannot directly apply to the task of QRNG
due to the subtle difference between QKD and QRNG in practice. In QKD, local
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randomness is assumed to be a free resource, while in QRNG, (local) randomness is the
goal to pursue. In fact, the randomness generated by the measurement (at most 2 bit
per run) is less than the randomness required for the state preparations (4 bit per run)
in MDIQKD [20]. Intuitively, the measurement in MDIQKD only establishes correlation
between the two communication parties and helps to generate a shared randomness, but
it does not generate additional randomness.
Recently, there are a few attempts that tackle the challenge of MDI QRNG,
including a qubit-modeled QRNG [27] and an MDI entanglement witness (MDIEW)
based QRNG [28]. These schemes are more secure than conventional QRNGs, in
the sense that some of the assumptions on the devices are removed. Comparing to
DIQRNGs, they are more practical on loss-tolerance. However, a key assumption in
the first scheme [27], that both the source and the measurement device are assumed to
be qubit systems, is difficult to be fulfilled in practice. For the second scheme [28], it
cannot tolerate basis-dependent losses, which puts strict constraints on measurement
devices.
Here, we present a loss-tolerant MDI QRNG scheme, stemming from a simple qubit
scheme that measures a state |+〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2 in the basis of {|0〉, |1〉}. The
randomness is originated in breaking the coherence of the input state [29]. In order to
validate the measurement devices, several additional quantum input states need to be
sent. Such validation procedure is related the concept of self-testing [30]. For example,
the source could check if the measurement device always outputs the correct eigenstate
when inputting the state |0〉. Note that if the measurement device faithfully measures
in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis, it should always output |0〉 deterministically. To reduce the
input randomness, testing input states should be rarely sent. In our analysis, we do not
require the source to be a single photon source. Instead, practical photon sources, such
as a weak coherent state source, can be used in our scheme.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we give a formal description
of our protocol. In Sections 3 to 6, we analyze our protocol. Our protocol can be divided
into two parts, measurement tomography and randomness quantification of a POVM,
thus Section 3 and Section 4 are devoted to these two parts respectively. In Section 5,
we analyze the finite size effect. Section 6 extends the analysis from a single-photon
source to a coherent-state source. Finally we conclude in Section 7.
2. Brief description of MDI QRNG
In our MDI QRNG scheme, a quantum source emits signals, which is measured by an
untrusted and uncharacterized device. The process is repeated for n times, among which
some of the runs are chosen as test runs and the rest for randomness generation. In
test runs, a measurement tomography is performed, while in a generation run, random
numbers are generated. The protocol is presented in Fig. 1.
Here is the intuition why the protocol works. From the test runs, the measurement
tomography is used to monitor the devices in real time. If the tomography result passes
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Table 1: The measurement device is designed to measure in the σz basis
for n runs. At the end of the protocol, the measurement device outputs a
uniformly random string of length rn, where r is the product of the ratio for
generation runs and the min-entropy of the raw measurement outcomes.
(i) Random seed: The user, Alice, randomly chooses a subset B ⊂ {1, · · · , n}
from the n runs.
(ii) Test mode: For rounds in the subset B, a trusted source randomly emits
qubit states |0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |+i〉 to an untrusted measurement device, where
|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |+i〉 are eigenstates of Pauli matrices σz, σz, σx, σy, respectively.
Then the measurement device outputs bits b ∈ {0, 1}. Alice uses these outputs
to perform a measurement tomography.
(iii) Generation mode: For the runs not in B, Alice sends the measurement device
a fixed state of |+〉. Again, the measurement device outputs bits b ∈ {0, 1}.
(iv) Extraction: Randomness extraction is performed on the raw outputs to obtain
a uniformly random string of length rn. The min-entropy of the raw data is
determined by the tomography results.
certain threshold, the user is sure that the measurement devices function properly. Of
particular interest is that how the protocol deals with losses in order to make it loss-
tolerant. We emphasize that in the protocol we do not discard the loss events. Instead,
the measurement device should always output 0 or 1. In practice, if there is no detection
click, the measurement device outputs 0. Intuitively, the positions of the loss are mixed
with real detected bits 0, restricting the adversary’s ability to output a fixed string.
Let us consider a simple attack that works for conventional QRNGs when the
measurement devices are untrusted and the loss is over 50%. A successful attack can
be defined as follows: an adversary, Eve, can manipulate the QRNG so that it outputs
a predetermined string (which could appear random to Alice)‡. When Eve can fully
control the measurement devices, she first performs the faithful measurement (without
losses) designated by the protocol. Then within the measurement outcomes, Eve post-
selects a string according to her predetermined string (which could appear random to
Alice). The post-selection works as follows: if a measurement outcome matches the
corresponding bit in Eve’s predetermined string, Eve announces the outcome, otherwise
she announces a loss. Then if the measurement outcomes contain an equal number of 0s
and 1s, approximately 50% of outcomes will be announced as losses. Thus the output
string could be predetermined without being noticed by the user.
Such attack will not work for our MDI QRNG. If Eve performs this attack and
‡ This is a classical adversary scenario, which can be extended to quantum adversary scenario [31].
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outputs 0 when she wishes to announce a loss, each bit of the outcomes will now
independently have probability 3/4 to be 0 and 1/4 to be 1. Thus the randomness
of the output is log2(4/3) per bit, which is nonzero.
By the protocol description, the randomness analysis can be naturally decomposed
into two parts, measurement tomography and randomness quantification given a
known positive-operator-valued measure (POVM). We thus divide the analysis into the
following two sections accordingly.
3. Measurement tomography
In this section, we investigate the following question. Given a trusted single photon
source, which is treated as a qubit, how to make a measurement tomography on a
detection device, whose dimension is unknown? Later, we will discuss how to replace
the single photon source with a more practical coherent state source.
Generally, there are three types of attacks for security protocols, individual attack
where Eve performs an identical and independent attack on each run, collective attack
where Eve probes the input state in each run separately and performs a joint post-
processing, and coherent attack where Eve might exploit the correlation between the
runs by probing all the inputs jointly [32]. In our protocol, to be more specific,
an individual attack means that the POVM of Eve in different runs will be the
same; a collective attack means Eve performs different POVMs in different runs but
uncorrelated; a coherent attack means the POVMs in different runs are correlated. We
will extend our security proof framework from individual attack to collective attack, and
leave coherent attack for future research.
Recall that we have restricted the measurement device to always output 1 and 0
in each run. Though the adversary could add an arbitrary number of ancillaries to
perform a high-dimensional PVM, its measurement operator can always be described
by a two-dimensional POVM with two outcomes {F0, F1} where F0+F1 = I, because of
the qubit input. Here, we start with the analysis under individual attacks and hence we
can assume the POVM elements are the same for every run. The extension to collective
attacks will be presented in Sec. 4.4.
For a qubit input state ρ, the probabilities of outputting 0 and 1 are given by
Prob(0|ρ) = tr(ρF0),
Prob(1|ρ) = tr(ρF1).
(3.1)
Any two-dimensional POVM has the form [33]
F0 = a1(I + ~n1 · σ),
F1 = a2(I + ~n2 · σ),
(3.2)
where σ is the vector composed of three Pauli matrices, ~n1 = (nx, ny, nz) and ~n2 are
three-dimensional real number vectors. The coefficients are real numbers and satisfy
a1, a2 ≥ 0, a1 + a2 = 1,
|~n1|, |~n2| ≤ 1, a1~n1 + a2~n2 = 0.
(3.3)
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In measurement tomography, one can input the four basis of two-dimensional
density matrices, (I + σz)/2, (I − σz)/2, (I + σx)/2, and (I + σy)/2, which correspond
to pure states |0〉, |1〉, |+〉, and |+i〉, respectively. The probabilities of outputting 0
for the four states can be estimated through counting the ratio of 0s in the test runs.
When there are an infinite number of runs, the estimation can be done accurately. From
Eq. (3.1), these probabilities are given by
Prob(0|(I + σz)/2) = a1 + a1nz ,
Prob(0|(I − σz)/2) = a1 − a1nz,
Prob(0|(I + σx)/2) = a1 + a1nx,
Prob(0|(I + σy)/2) = a1 + a1ny.
(3.4)
Then the coefficients a1, nx, ny, nz can be solved given the measurement results, the left
side quantities of Eq. (3.4). Note that if the input is a linear combination of these four
inputs, the probability of outputting 0 will also be a corresponding linear combination
of the above four probabilities. Without loss of generality and for ease of discussion, we
will assume a1 ≤ a2 hereafter.
There also exist tomography methods for coherent state source [34, 35, 36], thus
our MDI QRNG is readily extendable to practical sources, which will be detailed in
Section 6.
4. Quantifying randomness
After obtaining the two-output POVM set, {F0, F1} in Eq. (3.2), we need to quantify
how much randomness when an input state |+〉 is fed into the measurement device.
Here, we employ the widely-used min-entropy to quantify the randomness.
Given an (even pure) state, the evaluation of the output genuine randomness from
a POVM set, {F0, F1}, is not straightforward. A naive approach that the randomness
is just the entropy of the outcomes is not working. Consider the case of F0 = F1 = I/2,
then for any qubit input, both probabilities of outputting 0 and 1 are 1/2, and hence
the outcome entropy is 1. However, Eve could simply output this statistics using a
predetermined string (unknown to Alice) without being noticed§. That is, for this pair
of POVMs, no true randomness can be obtained by Alice. Thus, we need to find a
way to distinguish classical and quantum randomness. Similar issues are dealt when
randomness is used to quantify quantum coherence [29].
To lower bound the randomness, we should allow Eve to implement the
two POVMs in an arbitrary way. Denote Eve’s implementation as D and the
randomness corresponding to this implementation as R(F0, F1,D). Consider the worst
implementation D that minimizes R(F0, F1,D), the randomness of the POVM set,
§ This attack can also be understood as Alice measures one qubit of a maximally entangled pair while
Eve measures the other. The “predetermined” property comes from the fact that Eve can always
measure her qubit ahead.
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R(F0, F1), should be
R(F0, F1) = min
D
R(F0, F1,D). (4.1)
As an example of Eve’s implementation, Eve can choose a measurement of the
following form (the number of terms in the summation below is decided by Eve),
F0 =
∑
i
pi|ψi〉〈ψi|,
F1 =
∑
i
pi
∣∣ψ⊥i
〉〈
ψ⊥i
∣∣+ cI,
c+
∑
i
pi = 1,
(4.2)
which we call standard decomposition form. In this decomposition, with a probability of
c, Eve outputs 1 deterministically, while with probability 1−c, Eve chooses a set of two-
dimensional projection-valued measure (PVM), {ψi, ψ⊥i }, with a probability distribution
{pi}, and outputs the measurement outcome 0 or 1. Note that F0 and F1 are fixed due
to measurement tomography presented in Sec. 3.
For a standard decomposition D, we define the randomness when the input is |+〉
as
R(F0, F1,D) =
∑
i
piH∞(|〈+|ψi〉|2), (4.3)
where H∞(p) = − log2max(p, 1 − p) is the binary min-entropy function. Here is
the intuition behind this definition. The total randomness contains two parts: (1)
Randomness due to the choice of PVM from the decomposition D. This part contains
classical randomness (known to Eve) and thus should be discarded. (2) Randomness
associated with each PVM. This part contains real quantum randomness. For a PVM
{ψi, ψ⊥i }, the randomness is quantified by H∞(|〈+|ψi〉|2), as presented in Sec. 4.3. Note
that this definition of randomness also holds for general decompositions.
Although from Alice’s point of view, the POVM, {F0, F1}, is two-dimensional, Eve
can implement it with arbitrarily large dimension PVMs by adding ancillary systems.
Thus, as the first step shown in Sec. 4.1, we need to reduce their dimensions down to two.
In Sec. 4.2, we reduce a general two-dimensional PVM decomposition to the standard
decomposition form in Eq. (4.2). After that, we evaluate the genuine randomness with
the standard decomposition form in Sec. 4.3 and obtain the following theorem. In
Sec. 4.4, we extend this result from individual attacks to collective attacks.
Theorem 1. When |+〉 is fed into the measurement device, described by a POVM set
of {F0, F1} where F0 = a1(I + nxσx + nyσy + nzσz), the output randomness is given by
R(F0, F1) = 2a1H∞(
1 +
√
1− n2y − n2z
2
). (4.4)
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4.1. Reduce general measurement to two-dimensional PVM
Note that every mixed state is a mixture of pure states. Naturally, we can imagine that
every POVM can be decomposed into more basic building blocks, PVMs, as shown in
Fig. 1. Note that from Alice’s view, the measurement is described by a two-dimensional
POVM, but she does not know its inner working. While from Eve’s view, she is the one
who implements POVM with a mixture of different quantum processes, as shown by the
branches in Fig. 1. Generally, every POVM is a mixture of PVMs on the original state
and some ancilla αk (not necessarily of the same dimension), followed by assigning the
outcomes of PVMs to the outcomes of the POVM.
The mixture of PVMs can be implemented by Eve choosing PVM index k according
to some random variable. If the random variable is classical, we call it classical adversary.
If it is quantum, we call it quantum adversary.
In general, each ancilla αk can be a mixed state, which is decomposed to a spectrum
of pure states βkj . So, a PVM on the input state ρ and the mixed state ancilla αk can
be further decomposed into the PVM on the input state ρ and a statistical mixture of
pure state ancillas βkj, as shown in Fig. 1. Thus in the decomposition of a POVM,
the ancilla can be assumed to be a pure state βkj, without loss of generality. Moreover,
since a unitary transformation can evolve |0〉 to any pure ancilla state βkj , and a unitary
transformation can always be encompassed into a PVM, the ancilla can also be viewed
to be always in the state of |0〉. Here, the dimension of |0〉 can be large.
Figure 1: POVM decomposition. On the first level of the tree, the POVM on
the input ρ is implemented by Eve as an average of projective measurements
PVMk on ρ and a mixed ancilla state αk. On the second level of the tree,
each node PVMk on the first level is further decomposed to PVMk on ρ and
a pure ancilla state βkj. Note here βkj is a decomposition of the mixed state
αk.
Now, we can show that decomposing a POVM set into high-dimensional PVMs is
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equivalent to decomposing into two-dimensional ones. From Eve’s point of view, the
use of high-dimensional PVMs cannot reduce the output randomness further than using
only two-dimensional ones. We first characterize the randomness of a high-dimensional
PVM implementation of a POVM set. Then, we decompose the high-dimensional PVM
to two-dimensional PVMs, and show that the decomposition cannot increase the output
randomness.
Figure 2: An illustration of grouping. For an implementation of a POVM,
first a d-dimensional PVMk projects the input state and ancilla to one of its
d orthogonal basis and then groups these d outcomes to the two outcomes of
the POVM.
According to Born’s rule, the outcomes of PVM is intrinsically random [29]. Now
we can quantify the randomness of a high-dimensional PVM. While grouping the output
results of PVMs to the ones of the original POVMs, as shown in Fig. 2, we can view it
as a projection onto subspaces, which is still inherently random.
Take the following projection, which is performed as a branch of the decomposition
of the original POVM, for an example. It projects 0 to 0, and projects 1 and 2 to 1:
a|0〉+ b|1〉+ c|2〉 → a|0¯〉+
√
b2 + c2|1¯〉. (4.5)
So according to Born’s rule, projecting to the orthogonal subspaces, |0¯〉 and |1¯〉, is still
random. In this example,
Prob(0) = a2,
Prob(1) = b2 + c2,
(4.6)
and so the randomness of this three-dimensional PVM is H∞(Prob(0)) which is the
maximally possible given that the probability of outputting 0 is of value a2. Thus
viewing this part as a virtual two-dimensional POVM (note this is different from the
original POVM because there are many branches and this is just one of them) and
further decompose this POVM to multiple two-dimensional PVMs‖ will only decrease
the randomness.
‖ This can always be done by, e.g., the decomposition in Eq. (4.12) for an arbitrary two-dimensional
POVM.
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More generally, for a general d-dimensional PVM, we should also group its outputs
to the two outcomes of the original POVM. Suppose the values v1, · · · , vk are projected
to 0 (0 ≤ k ≤ d) and vk+1, · · · , vd are projected 1, then
d−1∑
i=0
ai|i〉 =
d∑
i=1
avi |vi〉 →
√√√√ k∑
i=1
a2vi |0¯〉+
√√√√
d∑
i=k+1
a2vi |1¯〉. (4.7)
The randomness is H∞(
∑k
i=1 a
2
vi
) and can be similarly reduced through replacing this
d-dimensional PVM by several branches of two-dimensional PVMs.
4.2. Reduce two-dimensional PVM to standard decomposition form
The reduction from a two-dimensional PVM decomposition to the standard
decomposition form consists of two steps: express the two-dimensional PVM
decomposition in a concise form, and then reduce it to the standard decomposition
form.
Recall that in the previous subsection, the outcomes of each d-dimensional PVM
will be grouped to two values 0 and 1. Take the specific case of d = 2, there are four
types of such grouping, as shown in Fig. 3. Denote the two bases of a two-dimensional
projective measurement PVMi as |ψi〉 and
∣∣ψ⊥i
〉
, which are orthogonal¶. In the first
type, |ψi〉〈ψi| and
∣∣ψ⊥i
〉〈
ψ⊥i
∣∣ contribute to F0 and F1 respectively. In the second type,∣∣ψ⊥i
〉〈
ψ⊥i
∣∣ and |ψi〉〈ψi| contribute to F0 and F1 respectively. By a change of variable
|ψi〉 =
∣∣φ⊥i
〉
, it is the same as the first case. In the third type, both |ψi〉〈ψi| and
∣∣ψ⊥i
〉〈
ψ⊥i
∣∣
contribute to F0. In the fourth type, both |ψi〉〈ψi| and
∣∣ψ⊥i
〉〈
ψ⊥i
∣∣ contribute to F1.
Figure 3: Four types of assigning the outcome of PVM (0 or 1) to the outcome
of POVM (0 or 1). In the first type, |ψi〉〈ψi| and
∣∣ψ⊥i
〉〈
ψ⊥i
∣∣ contribute to F0
and F1 respectively. In the second type, by a change of variable |ψi〉 =
∣∣φ⊥i
〉
,
it is similar to the first case. In the third type, I contributes to F0. In the
fourth type, I contributes to F1.
¶ Here the bases of two-dimensional PVMi are not simply |0〉 and |1〉 because different PVMi have
different reference frames. To be consistent, we take the reference frame of the original POVM and
PVMi will accordingly have bases |ψi〉 and
∣∣ψ⊥
i
〉
.
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By combining all PVMs with assignments of the third type (i.e., F0 will have a
term b1I), and combining all PVMs with assignments of the fourth type (i.e., F1 will
have a term b2I), a decomposition D1 has the expression,
F0 = b1I + 0 +
∑
i≥3
pi|ψi〉〈ψi|,
F1 = 0 + b2I +
∑
i≥3
pi
∣∣ψ⊥i
〉〈
ψ⊥i
∣∣,
b1 + b2 +
∑
i≥3
pi = 1,
(4.8)
where the summation comes from PVMs with assignments of the first type and the
second type.
Next, we prove it can be reduced to the standard decomposition form in the sense
that the value of R(F0, F1) will not change when restricting the minimization over the
standard decomposition form. Take c = b2 − b1, we obtain a decomposition D2, which
is equivalent to D1.
F0 = b1|+〉〈+|+ b1|−〉〈−|+
∑
i≥3
pi|ψi〉〈ψi|,
F1 = b1|−〉〈−|+ b1|+〉〈+|+
∑
i≥3
pi
∣∣ψ⊥i
〉〈
ψ⊥i
∣∣+ cI,
2b1 + c+
∑
i≥3
pi = 1,
(4.9)
Let |ψ1〉 = |+〉 (thus
∣∣ψ⊥1
〉
= |−〉), |ψ2〉 = |−〉 (thus
∣∣ψ⊥2
〉
= |+〉) and p1 = p2 = b1, then
the decomposition D2 is in the standard decomposition form Eq. (4.2).
Finally, we just need to prove that
R(F0, F1,D1) = R(F0, F1,D2). (4.10)
On one hand, F0 = I and F1 = 0 means that the output is always 0 and there is
no randomness. On the other hand, H∞(〈+|+〉) = H∞(〈+|−〉) = 0 also gives no
randomness. Thus the difference between the two decompositions gives no randomness
and thus they are equal in all cases.
4.3. Minimization of standard decomposition form
From the previous two subsections, we conclude that without loss of generality, the
strategy of Eve can be restricted to the standard decomposition form. In this subsection,
we allow Eve to choose the best strategy within the standard decomposition form. Recall
that in this case, the randomness measure for the POVM can be expressed as
R(F0, F1) = min
pi,|ψi〉
∑
i
piH∞(|〈+|ψi〉|2), (4.11)
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According to Eq. (4.2), a simple example of decomposition of the POVM can be
given by,
F0 = a1(1− |~n1|)I + a1(|~n1|I + ~n1 · σ),
F1 = a2(1− |~n2|)I + a2(|~n2|I + ~n2 · σ).
(4.12)
whose randomness property and relation to the standard decomposition form is proven
in Appendix A. In particular, note that a1(|~n1|I+~n1 ·σ) and a2(|~n2|I+~n2 ·σ) are a set of
PVMs because a1~n1 + a2~n2 = 0. Thus one can obtain a random measurement outcome
for this decomposition. However, this may not be the optimized decomposition for Eve,
because the output randomness for this decomposition will be larger than R(F0, F1).
Then following some previous work, which utilizes a general decomposition to quantify
randomness [37], we try to obtain an accurate expression of the minimum randomness
R(F0, F1) corresponding to an optimized decomposition of the POVM.
A general expression of a mixed state can be written as:
ρ =
∑
i
qi|ϕi〉〈ϕi|,
=
(I + nxσx + nyσy + nzσz)
2
.
(4.13)
When performing a measurement on the bases {|+〉, |−〉}, the outcome randomness can
be expressed as
R(ρ) = min
qi,|ϕi〉
[H∞(qi) +
∑
i
qiH∞(|〈ϕi|+〉|2)], (4.14)
where the first term H∞(qi) represents the classical randomness originating from the
probability distribution of qi, and it should be discarded in the following analysis. Thus,
the net quantum randomness output is given by
R(ρ) = min
qi,|ϕi〉
∑
i
qiH∞(|〈ϕi|+〉|2). (4.15)
When performing the POVM given in Eq. (4.2) on an input state |+〉, since the
term cI generates no randomness, the output randomness has a similar form
R(F0, F1) = min
pi,|ψi〉
∑
i
piH∞(|〈+|ψ〉|2). (4.16)
The bases in the PVM {|ψ〉, ∣∣ψ⊥〉} and an arbitrary pure state |φ〉 have a natural
duality. That is, the probability of projecting |φ〉 on |ψ〉 is equal to that of projecting
|ψ〉 on |φ〉:
|〈ψ|φ〉|2 = |〈φ|ψ〉|2. (4.17)
Then we can easily find the quantum randomness in Eq. (4.15) and Eq. (4.16) are the
same.
In addition, the measurement basis |ψi〉〈ψi| has a pure state form
|ψi〉〈ψi| = I + ni · σ
2
. (4.18)
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Combining Eq. (3.2) and Eq. (4.2) we can get∑
i
pi = 2a1. (4.19)
Then if we let p′i = pi/2a1, the quantum randomness R(F0, F1) can be rewritten as
R(F0, F1) = 2a1 min
p′
i
,|ψi〉
∑
i
p′iH∞(|〈ψi|+〉|2). (4.20)
According to related study to quantify randomness for a mixed state and PVM
[38, 29], the mixed state randomness in Eq. (4.15) can be expressed as
R(ρ) = H∞(
1 +
√
1− n2y − n2z
2
). (4.21)
Thus Eq. (4.20), as well as Eq. (4.16), can be simplified to
R(F0, F1) = 2a1H∞(
1 +
√
1− n2y − n2z
2
). (4.22)
One can see that, as long as ny or nz is nonzero, R(F0, F1) is always positive.
Note that the choice of |+〉 is not compulsory. Other input states can be used as
randomness generation by a simple rotation of the reference frame. Take |0〉 for
example, the randomness of the outcome corresponding to this new input state is
R(F0, F1) = 2a1H∞((1 +
√
1− n2x − n2y)/2).
4.4. From individual attack to collective attack
Now, we have showed the quantification of output randomness under individual attacks.
For a collective attack, since Eve can perform independent different attacks to each run.
That is, for the ith round (1 ≤ i ≤ n), she performs POVMi, thus the total output
randomness is
n∑
i=1
R(POVMi). (4.23)
If the function R is convex, we have
n∑
i=1
R(POVMi) ≥ nR(
∑n
i=1 POVMi
n
), (4.24)
where the expression in the bracket on the right hand side is exactly the tomography
result. So, in order to generalize individual attacks to collective attacks, it suffices to
examine the convexity property of the randomness quantification Eq. (4.22), as shown
in Appendix B. Thus, our randomness quantification Eq. (4.22) holds against collective
attacks.
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5. Statistical fluctuation
The above analysis assumes that the protocol has an infinite number of runs, such that
the parameters can be accurately estimated. However in practice, protocols are only
allowed to run for a finite amount of time, which results in imperfect tomography due
to statistical fluctuations. Thus in this section, we take account of the finite-size effect
by bounding the key parameters a1, a1nx, a1ny, a1nz in Eq. (3.4), using the techniques
in QKD [39]. Whether to use the upper bound or the lower bound of the parameters,
depends on which gives the minimum randomness output according to our previous
analysis. This will give the most conservative estimate on the output randomness.
In a test run, Alice sends one of the four states ρ1 = I−σz, ρ2 = I+σx, ρ3 = I+σy,
ρ4 = I + σz and obtains the probabilities of outputting 0, denoted by ex1, ex2, ex3, ex4
that correspond to their asymptotic values a1 − a1nz, a1 + a1nx, a1 + a1ny, a1 + a1nz,
respectively. After the protocol finishes, the number of test runs with input ρi is denoted
as Ni, i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Let N0 denote the number of non-test runs. Recall that in each non-test run, Alice
sends ρ2 = |+〉〈+|. Let ezi be the probability of outputting 0 if the input of the non-test
runs were ρi instead. Define the bound,
ezi ≤ exi + θ, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 (5.1)
where θ is the deviation due to statistical fluctuations.
Following the random sampling results of Fung et al. [39], we can bound the quantity
ez1 when Eq. (5.1) fails,
εθ = Prob(ez1 > ex1 + θ)
≤
√
N1 +N0√
N1N0ex1(1− ex1)
2−(N1+N0)ξ1(θ),
(5.2)
where ξ1(θ) = H(ex1 +N0θ/(N0 +N1))− [N1H(ex1) +N0H(ex1 + θ)]/(N0 +N1). Here
H(p) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p) is the binary Shannon entropy function. Note that
in an unlikely event when ex1 = 0, one should re-derive the failure probability or simply
replace ex1 with a small value, say, 1/N1.
Note that the original random sampling trick is applied on variables between [0, 1].
However, the range of ezi is [−1, 1] for i = 2, 3, 4. This requires a normalization which
scales from [−1, 1] to [0, 1]. This normalization transforms y to y′ = (1 + y)/2 which
yields
εθ = Prob(ezi > exi + θ) ∀i = 2, 3, 4
≤ 4
√
Ni +N0√
NiN0(1 + exi)(1− exi)
2−(Ni+N0)ξi(θ),
(5.3)
where ξi(θ) = H((1+ exi)/2+N0θ/(N0+Ni))− [NiH((1+ exi)/2)+N0H((1+ exi)/2+
θ)]/(N0 +Ni).
Practically, we can let the failure probability εθ to be a small number for certain
applications, say 2−100. Once the upper bound of εθ is fixed, there is a trade-off between
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Ni/(N0 + Ni), θ and the ratio of the final random bit length over the raw data size
R(F0, F1). In addition, a suitable Ni can be chosen to optimize R(F0, F1).
Also note that the input randomness is on the order of logN0 to achieve a desired
small failure probability, while the output randomness is on the order of N0, thus an
exponential expansion of randomness is achieved.
6. From single photon source to coherent source
In practice, a weak coherent state photon source (highly attenuated laser) is widely used
as an imperfect single photon source. To make our MDI QRNG scheme practical, we
need to use a coherent light as the trusted source. This change introduces two obstacles
in analysis. One is that the input states are changed in tomography. The other is
the final output randomness is different. Since the intensity of the source can be used
to estimate the single photon component emitted from the source, we can bound the
output randomness with an “imperfect” tomography.
For a coherent state with a mean photon number µ, a phase randomization
procedure transforms a superposition of Fork state into a mixture. In other words,
the final state can be divided into three components, vacuum, single photon, and multi-
photon. Since these three parts are orthogonal, they can be treated as different channels
separately. By controlling the intensity µ low enough, the multi-photon component can
be suppressed. We prove a lower bound on the randomness of our MDI QRNG with a
coherent state source, using a series of relaxations.
As for the vacuum component, in the worst case scenario, we assume the adversary
Eve is able to determine the outcomes ahead, and hence no true randomness can
be generated. As shown in Fig. 4, the measurement is equivalent to a virtual qubit
measurement with F0 = d1I and F1 = (1− d1)I on any qubit state input.
Figure 4: Combining the channel of the vacuum component and the single
photon component. Note that after combination, the randomness can only
decrease, giving a lower bound on the original channels.
With these preparations at hand, we now can perform tomography on the qubit-
POVM with a coherent state. Denote the POVM of the single photon component to
be F ′0 = d
′
1I + d
′
2σ, F
′
1 = (1 − d′1)I − d′2σ. Since the proportion of the vacuum and the
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single photon component are e−µ and µe−µ, we can combine the POVM of the single
photon with the virtual POVM on the vacuum,
F ′′0 = d1Ie
−µ + (d′1I + d
′
2σ)µe
−µ
F ′′1 = (1− d1)Ie−µ + ((1− d′1)I − d′2σ)µe−µ,
(6.1)
as shown in Fig. 4. Here the combined channel will have a proportion that is the sum of
the proportion of single photon and vacuum in the original channels, which is (1+µ)e−µ.
We now verify such a combination will not be an overestimate on the output
randomness. Originally the actual randomness comes from each separate component,
which corresponds to F0, F1 for the vacuum and F
′
0, F
′
1 for single photon. Since the
output randomness of F0, F1 is independent of its qubit input, without loss of generality,
the input of F0, F1 can be set to the single photon component input. For example, as
illustrated in the middle part of Fig. 4, since the qubit input to the single photon
component is I + σz, the input of the virtual measurement F0, F1 is also set to I + σz.
Recall that the randomness measure is the minimum over all decompositions. Since
the decomposition F ′0 = F0e
−µ + F ′0µe
−µ, F ′0 = F0e
−µ + F ′0µe
−µ is also a decomposition
of a combined POVM and this decomposition corresponds to exactly the sum of the
original randomness of vacuum and single photon channels, the randomness measure of
the combined POVM can serve as a lower bound on the original randomness. Hence,
using this combined POVM will not overestimate the output randomness.
In summary, vacuum component and single photon component can be combined as
one source to generate randomness and previous analysis in Sec. 4 still applies. That is,
for randomness generation purpose, both vacuum state and single-photon state can be
regarded as an ideal qubit state. This is similar to QKD, where vacuum state can also
be used to generate secure keys [40].
Now we need to take multi-photons components into account. We consider the worst
case scenario [41] where multi-photon components do not contribute to randomness
generation.
In addition, multi-photon states have the effect of making the tomography
imperfect. We conservatively assume multi-photon states will always lead to a
tomography outcome which minimizes the output randomness. In order to make
the randomness smaller, according to Eq. (4.22), Eve should make a1, nx and ny
smaller. Considering the multi-photons components, after POVM on the new input
state τi, (i = 1, 2, 3, 4), the constrains on the probabilities of the output 0 for τi are
respectively
0 ≤ Prob(0|τ1)− a1(1 + µ)e−µ ≤ 1− e−µ − µe−µ
(a1 + a1nx)(1 + µ)e
−µ ≤ Prob(0|τ2)
(a1 + a1ny)(1 + µ)e
−µ ≤ Prob(0|τ3)
(a1 + a1nz)(1 + µ)e
−µ ≤ Prob(0|τ4),
(6.2)
where equalities hold when the multi-photon component does not yield the result of 0 for
the last three inequalities. So the bounds of the parameters can be estimated through
experimentally obtaining Prob(0|τi), (1 ≤ i ≤ 4).
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Then we estimate the randomness from the vacuum and single photon component,
which are combined as shown in Fig. 4. Thus after calculating randomness of the
tomographies POVM with input state (I+σx)/2, we multiply by a factor of (1+µ)e
−µ,
which is the proportion of the single photon and the vacuum components,
R(F0, F1) ≥ max
µ
2a1(1 + µ)
eµ
H(
1 +
√
1− n2z − n2y
2
), (6.3)
where the parameters are constrained by Eq. (6.2).
We simulate a typical experiment setup to examine the dependency of random bit
rate R on the total transmittance η. In this setup, a coherent laser with intensity µ
and polarization |+〉 sends pulses to a measurement apparatus that performs Z basis
measurement with low efficiency detectors. The results are shown in Fig. 5, with the
simulation details in Appendix C.
In practice, the laser intensity can be adjusted to optimize the performance. Thus in
the simulation, we numerically optimize the laser intensity µ to maximize the random bit
rate R. By the simulation, the optimal intensity of the coherent state µ is approximately
proportional to η (µ ≈ 0.2η), which can be seen from the right panel of Fig. 5.
The logarithm of the optimal random bit rate is approximately proportional to the
logarithm of η, as can be seen from the left panel of Fig. 5. Moreover, by examining the
figure more carefully, the random bit rate decreases by 106 when the transmittance η
decreases from 0 db to 30 db. Thus the optimal random bit rate R scales quadratically
with η.
These scalings are similar to the early analysis of QKD [41], where the optimal
intensity is also linear with the transmittance and the key rate is quadratic with the
transmittance. In the development of QKD, the decoy state technique has increased
the key rate to be linear with the transmittance [42]. It would be interesting to explore
whether similar ideas can be used to improve the random bit rate in our protocol.
With a typical 100 MHz repetition rate laser and a typical total transmittance value
η = 10%, the simulation shows that the random bit rate is over 5 × 104 bit/sec, which
is five magnitudes higher than the current record of DIQRNG, 0.4 bit/sec [17].
7. Conclusion
In summary, we have proposed a measurement-device-independent QRNG. Our QRNG
works when the detectors have low efficiency and have arbitrary imperfections. In
contrast to MDI-QKD and MDI-EW, our protocol does not need space-like separation,
which can be intuitively explained by the fact that one should perform error correction
and privacy amplification in QKD, while one only needs to perform privacy amplification
in QRNG. There are two possible implementations of our scheme, either by using a single
photon source or by using a coherent state. The former has higher random bit rate while
the latter is more practical.
For future work, it would be interesting to extend the analysis to coherent attack.
Intuitively, the best coherent attack is usually just the collective attack. Since our
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Figure 5: Random bit rate R with a coherent state source of an average
photon number µ. The left figure shows the dependency of the optimized
bit rate on the transmission loss. The right figure shows the average photon
number µ corresponding to the optimal bit rate.
protocol is permutation invariant, that is, the order of different runs can be arbitrarily
changed, we can extend the analysis from collective attack to coherent attack possibly
by applying the Post-Selection principle [43], which may give a moderate increase on
the security parameter. Or we can possibly use the work of Miller and Shi [31] to extend
from a classical adversary to a quantum adversary, which is essentially the difference
between collective attack and coherent attack.
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Appendix A. Proof that Eq. (4.12) is of standard decomposition form
In this section we show that Eq. (4.12) is a meaningful special case of Eq. (4.2) and
analyse the randomness generation of each term of the POVM in Eq. (4.12).
In Eq. (4.12), if we let c1 = a1(1−|~n1|), c2 = a2(1−|~n2|), c = c2−c1, then Eq. (4.12)
can be rewritten as
F0 = c1(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|) + a1(|~n1|I + ~n1 · σ),
F1 = c1(|1〉〈1|+ |0〉〈0|) + cI + a2(|~n2|I + ~n2 · σ)
(A.1)
Comparing with Eq. (4.2), we can see that c1(|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|) and c1(|1〉〈1|+ |0〉〈0|) are
two terms of
∑
pi|ψi〉〈ψi| and
∑
pi
∣∣ψ⊥i
〉〈
ψ⊥i
∣∣, respectively. According to Eq. (3.3), we
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have
a1|~n1| = a2|~n2| (A.2)
a1~n1 · σ = −a2~n2 · σ (A.3)
Therefore the rest part a1(|~n1|I+~n1 ·σ) and a2(|~n2|I+~n2 ·σ) have the same coefficients,
which compose the other terms of
∑
pi|ψi〉〈ψi| and
∑
pi
∣∣ψ⊥i
〉〈
ψ⊥i
∣∣.
Figure A1: The first and third dashed boxes have no contribution to the
randomness, while the second one does.
For such a decomposition, considering an arbitrary input state in |0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |+i〉,
we can easily check that the output randomness only originate from the term a1(|~n1|I+
~n1 · σ) and a2(|~n2|I + ~n2 · σ), as shown in Fig. A1, which is consistent with our previous
results.
Appendix B. Convexity of Eq. (4.22)
We notice that R in Eq. (4.22) is a linear function of a1, thus it is convex with respect
to a1. For a1nx, since it does not appear in Eq. (4.22), the convexity with respect to
a1nx also holds. For a1nz and a1ny, due to the symmetry, we just need to check for one
of them, and denote z = a1ny. A direct calculation of the second order derivatives of z
on R gives
∂2R(F0, F1)
∂z2
=
∂22a1H∞((1 +
√
1− (z/a1)2 − n2z)/2)
∂z2
=
Cz2/a31
(1− (z/a1)2 − n2z)(1 +
√
1− (z/a1)2 − n2z)2
+
Cz2/a31
(1− (z/a1)2 − n2z)2/3(1 +
√
1− (z/a1)2 − n2z)
+
C/a1√
1− (z/a1)2 − n2z(1 +
√
1− (z/a1)2 − n2z)
≥ 0,
(B.1)
where C = 1/ ln 2. Since the second order derivative is positive, the convexity holds for
z = a1ny.
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There is another way to prove the convex property of R. Recall that the
randomness measure R is obtained by a minimization over all possible decomposition of
a POVM. For such a convex roof measure, since the best decomposition of POVMi
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), {pij, |ψij〉}j=1,···,mi also constitutes a decomposition of
∑
POVMi/n,
{pij/n, |ψij〉}i=1,···,n,j=1,···,mi, we have
1
n
n∑
i=1
R(POVMi) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(
∑
j
pijH∞(|〈0|ψij〉|2))
=
∑
ij
pij
n
H∞(|〈0|ψij〉|2)
≥ R(
∑n
i=1 POVMi
n
),
(B.2)
thus the convexity holds.
Appendix C. Simulation
Here are details for the simulation model. A phase randomization procedure transforms
a coherent state to a mixture of Fock states. With a mean photon number µ,
the probabilities of vacuum component, single photon component and multi-photon
component are respectively e−µ, µe−µ, 1 − e−µ − µe−µ. Considering the Z basis
measurement on such a input mixed state, assuming a no-detection event to be mapped
into output 1, the probability of output 0 is given by
Prob(0) = Prob(0|vacuum)e−µ
+ Prob(0|singlephoton)µe−µ
+ Prob(0|multiphoton)(1− e−µ − µe−µ)
(C.1)
In experiments, the polarization of the single photon component can be adjusted into
the following four states = I, I + σx, I + σy, I + σz. Setting Prob(0|multiphoton) to
be 0 and 1, the bound of Prob(0) of the corresponding four input coherent state τ ′i
(i = 1, 2, 3, 4) are
ηµe−µ/2 ≤ Prob(0|τ ′1) ≤ηµe−µ/2 + (eµ − 1− µ)e−µ
ηµe−µ/2 ≤ Prob(0|τ ′2) ≤ηµe−µ/2 + (eµ − 1− µ)e−µ
ηµe−µ/2 ≤ Prob(0|τ ′3) ≤ηµe−µ/2 + (eµ − 1− µ)e−µ
ηµe−µ ≤ Prob(0|τ ′4) ≤ ηµe−µ + (eµ − 1− µ)e−µ
(C.2)
Comparing with Eq. (6.2), we can easily obtain the constrains on parameters a1,
ny, and nz. According to Eq. (6.3), for an arbitrary set of a1, ny, and nz, we can
find an optimal µ to maximize the final randomness R(F0, F1). Then R(F0, F1) can be
calculated based on its monotonicity and an optimal µ.
The result of our simulation model is shown in Fig. 5. We can easily check that the
final output randomness will be positive.
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